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ABSTRACT 
 Negative repetitive thinking, such as worry and rumination, is considered a common risk 
factor for anxiety and depression. Compared to traditional research that has focused almost 
exclusively on the content and amount of worrying, Berenbaum (2010) proposed an initiation–
termination (IT) two-phase model of worrying in which the initiation and termination phases of 
worry are differentiated. Extending the IT model to rumination, we aimed to explore cognitive 
and affective mechanisms involved in different phases of worry and rumination. We first 
examined the relationship between worry and rumination, focusing on testing the potential utility 
of the bi-factor model as an alternative to traditional “common” vs. “distinctive” approaches. 
Next, we examined the utility of new tools (i.e., laboratory tasks, ecological momentary 
assessment) developed to assess the initiation and termination phases of worry and rumination. 
Lastly, we investigated which attentional and executive processes, if any, are involved in the 
initiation and termination of worry and rumination, while considering the potential influence of 
negative temperament.  
 We found that the structural relationship between worry and rumination is best 
represented by a bi-factor model, which suggests that worry and rumination share certain 
common aspects (negative repetitive thinking), but that there are still unique aspects to each. In 
addition, we found that 1) worry and rumination are linked with different types of attentional 
bias (e.g., threat/danger, loss/failure), and 2) the initiation and termination phases are 
differentially associated with executive functions when taking negative temperament into 
account. This research highlights the potential value of paying attention to both common and 
unique aspects of worry and rumination and distinguishing different phases of worry and 
rumination when investigating the attentional and affective mechanisms involved.  
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Worry, Rumination, Psychopathology 
 Repetitive and prolonged thinking is essentially a normal and adaptive process that 
everyone engages in, sometimes involving positive outcomes such as self-reflection or cognitive 
and emotional processing of an event (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003; Watkins, 
2008). However, it can also have maladaptive and unconstructive consequences depending on 
some of its characteristics, such as the content of thoughts and their controllability (Segerstrom 
et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). For example, persistent negative thinking, such as worry and 
rumination, is a hallmark feature of emotional disorders (Ruscio, Seitchik, Gentes, Jones, & 
Hallion, 2011; Watkins, 2008). Worry involves a stream of thoughts and images that are 
negatively valenced and relatively uncontrollable. It is concerned with future events that entail 
possible negative outcomes (Berenbaum, 2010; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983) 
and it involves a subjective experience of unpleasantness (Berenbaum, 2010). Rumination is 
defined as repetitive, self-referential thinking on a theme related to personal goals and concerns 
in the absence of immediate external demands requiring such thinking (Martin & Tesser, 1996). 
It is mainly about past events, especially past loss or failure (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
 Worry and rumination are closely linked to psychopathology, particularly anxiety 
disorders and depression. Worry is a defining feature for anxiety disorders, especially 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Brown, Barlow, & Liebowitz, 1994). The main diagnostic 
criteria for GAD include “excessive worry” and “a sense of uncontrollability of worry” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Rumination is considered an important vulnerability 
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factor for depression (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Studies have shown that rumination is closely 
associated with the onset, duration, and severity of current depressive symptoms and is a strong 
predictor of future depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
 Although worry and rumination are distinguished in certain aspects (e.g., time-orientation) 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), they appear to share a considerable number of characteristics 
(Ruscio et al., 2011; Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). For example, both are negatively 
valenced, repetitive thinking that are primarily verbal-linguistic (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010) and 
self-focused (Mor & Winquist, 2002). In particular, with an increased focus on the trans-
diagnostic mechanisms underlying cognitive-affective dysfunctions across disorders, recent 
research proposes that worry and rumination represent a common core process of perseverative 
or repetitive thought and a tendency to engage in negative thinking in a repetitive, dyscontrolled 
manner (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Segerstrom et al., 2003). Negative repetitive thinking is 
considered a common risk factor for the emotional difficulties observed in GAD and major 
depressive disorder (MDD) (Ruscio et al., 2011; Watkins, 2008).  
Link Between Attentional and Executive Processes and Worry/Rumination 
 A growing body of research suggests a close link between impairments in executive 
functions and worry and rumination. For example, impaired performance on attention control 
tasks was associated with the increased frequency of intrusive thoughts (Verwoerd, de Jong, & 
Wessel, 2008; Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & de Vrieze, 2008). Similarly, individuals with 
greater working memory capacity showed enhanced suppression of negative thoughts (C. Brewin 
& Beaton, 2002; C. R. Brewin & Smart, 2005). Furthermore, Bredemeier and Berenbaum (2013) 
found that working memory deficits predicted changes in levels of worry over time, suggesting 
that working memory impairment may function as a risk factor for excessive worry. Rumination 
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has also been associated with deficits in executive functions (Von Hippel, Vasey, Gonda, & 
Stern, 2008; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Even after controlling for depressive symptoms, 
rumination was associated with perseverative tendencies on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), leading the researchers to link rumination with “attentional 
inflexibility.” Studies have shown that ruminators show difficulty shifting from current thoughts 
to other topics and updating their thinking with new ideas (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & 
De Raedt, 2011) and suppressing automatic or prepotent responses.  
 Both worry and rumination have also been associated with attentional bias to negative 
information. Compared to controls, individuals with pathological worry (e.g., in GAD) show 
longer latencies to name the colors of threat words than neutral words, indicating that their 
attention is automatically grabbed by threat-related information (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 
2001). Rumination has also been associated with an attentional bias, particularly for mood-
congruent information (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Leyman, 
De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007). Ruminators show difficulty preventing information from 
entering working memory (Joormann, 2004) as well as difficulty disengaging attention from 
negative materials (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Koster et al., 2011). 
 In investigating the attentional/cognitive processes involved in worry and rumination it is 
important to consider the modulating effect of affective factors, such as negative temperament. 
Negative temperament, defined as a tendency to experience negative emotions such as anxiety, 
anger, guilt, and depressed mood (Watson & Clark, 1984), has been shown to have an impairing 
effect on cognitive control. For example, recent findings examining brain activity during an 
emotional Stroop task indicated that negative temperament was associated with reduced activity 
in the left posterior DLPFC, which is involved in top-down, goal-directed control of attention 
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(Crocker et al., 2012). Similarly, high trait anxiety (a construct related to trait NA) was 
associated with deficient recruitment of DLPFC in a response-conflict task even in the absence 
of threat-related stimuli (Bishop, 2009).  
Berenbaum (2010)’s Initiation – Termination Two-Phase Model of Worry 
 Berenbaum (2010) proposed an initiation–termination (IT) two-phase model of worrying 
in which the initiation and termination phases of worry are differentiated. He argued that worry 
should not be considered a static entity, but should instead be thought of as a dynamic process 
that unfolds over time (Berenbaum, 2010). Compared to traditional research that has focused on 
the content and the amount of time spent on worrying, the IT model suggests that the following 
three aspects of worrying need more attention: (a) how easily worrying is initiated; (b) how 
easily worrying is terminated; and (c) the pattern of worrying over time. Berenbaum (2010) 
further proposed that each phase is influenced by different cognitive-affective factors. In relation 
to worry initiation, he proposed that attention biases to threat contribute to the perception of 
threat and hence initiate worry. The strong association between attention bias toward threat and 
GAD supports this link (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). When it comes to worry termination, 
Berenbaum (2010) proposed that a perseverative-iterative style (Davey & Levy, 1998), the 
tendency to dwell on a topic of concern, leads to delayed/absent acceptance of the prospect of 
threat, which in turn contributes to delayed/absent worry termination. Although not explicitly 
mentioned, a perseverative-iterative style can relate to attention processes such as attentional 
control, since it may influence the ability to control and inhibit negative thoughts.  To my 
knowledge, no such comprehensive cognitive model has been suggested in relation to rumination.  
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Overview of Research Questions and Studies 
 The overarching goal of the proposed research was to explore cognitive and affective 
mechanisms involved in worry and rumination. In Chapter 2, we examined the relationship 
between worry and rumination, focusing on testing the potential utility of the bi-factor model as 
an alternative to traditional “common” vs. “distinctive” approaches. In Chapter 3, we examined 
the utility of new tools (i.e., laboratory tasks, ecological momentary assessment) developed to 
assess the initiation and termination phases of worry and rumination. In Chapter 4, we 
investigated which attentional and executive processes, if any, are involved in the initiation and 
termination of worry and rumination, while considering the potential influence of negative 
temperament. The long-term goal of this program of research is to elucidate common and unique 
mechanisms involved in the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression, which 
may in turn inform the development of targeted interventions to reduce anxiety and depressive 
symptoms.   
  




A BI-FACTOR APPROACH TO MODELING THE STRUCTURE OF WORRY AND 
RUMINATION 
 Repetitive and prolonged thinking is essentially a normal and adaptive process that 
everyone engages in, sometimes involving positive outcomes such as self-reflection or cognitive 
and emotional processing of an event (Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). However, it can 
also have maladaptive and unconstructive consequences depending on some of its characteristics, 
such as the content of thoughts and their controllability (Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). 
Worry and rumination are examples of potentially maladaptive repetitive thinking. Worry 
involves a stream of thoughts and images that are negatively valenced and relatively 
uncontrollable. It is concerned with future events that entail possible negative outcomes and it 
involves a subjective experience of unpleasantness (Berenbaum, 2010; Borkovec et al., 1983). 
Rumination is defined as repetitive, self-referential thinking on a theme related to personal goals 
and concerns in the absence of immediate external demands requiring such thinking (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996). It is mainly about past events, especially past loss or failure (Martin & Tesser, 
1996; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Thus, worry and rumination are thought to differ in their 
content and temporal focus, such that worry concerns thoughts of future potential threat, whereas 
rumination concerns thoughts of past losses and failures (Borkovec et al., 1983; Martin & Tesser, 
1996). 
 Negative repetitive thinking is a hallmark feature of emotional disorders (Ruscio et al., 
2011; Watkins, 2008). Worry is a defining feature of anxiety disorders, especially generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) (Brown et al., 1994). The main diagnostic criteria for GAD include 
“excessive worry” and “a sense of uncontrollability of worry” (APA, 2013). Rumination, on the 
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other hand, is considered an important vulnerability factor for depression. Studies have shown 
that rumination is closely associated with the onset, duration, and severity of current depressive 
symptoms and is a strong predictor of future depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
 Whereas the majority of past research has focused on the unique and specific features of 
worry and rumination (Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987; Clark, Beck, & Brown, 
1989), a number of  recent studies have drawn attention to common characteristics shared by 
worry and rumination (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Ruscio et al., 2011; 
Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008). For example, both worry and rumination are primarily 
verbal-linguistic and involve self-focused negative thoughts (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Stokes & 
Hirsch, 2010). With an increased focus on the transdiagnostic mechanisms underlying cognitive-
affective dysfunctions among mood and anxiety disorders, recent research proposes that worry 
and rumination represent a common core process of perseverative thought and a tendency to 
engage in negative thinking in a repetitive, uncontrolled manner (Segerstrom et al., 2003; 
Watkins, 2008). Similarly, whereas previous research suggested that worry was correlated more 
strongly with anxiety than with depression, and that rumination was correlated more strongly 
with depression than anxiety (Beck et al., 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1989), recent studies found 
that “negative repetitive thinking” is a common risk factor for the emotional difficulties observed 
in both GAD and major depressive disorder (McEvoy et al., 2013; Ruscio et al., 2011; Watkins, 
2008).  
 The nature of the relation between worry and rumination remains unclear.  As described 
above, two major approaches that have been proposed in the literature thus far are: (1) worry and 
rumination are distinct entities (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989); and (2) worry and 
rumination represent common functional processes (Ruscio et al., 2011). Alternatively, it is 
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possible that worry and rumination share some common characteristics, but there remain some 
unique aspects to each – in other words, a bi-factor structure. Investigation of a bi-factor model 
has proven to be effective in elucidating the complicated relationships among highly relevant 
psychological constructs. For example, the bi-factor model was successfully employed to 
describe the structural relationship of general and specific factors (e.g., interpersonal, affective, 
impulsivity) of psychopathy as assessed by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Patrick, Hicks, 
Nichol, & Krueger, 2007). Similarly, a bi-factor model of ADHD latent symptom structure (with 
a general factor and specific factors of inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity) was found to be 
superior to existing factor models of ADHD  (Martel, Von Eye, & Nigg, 2010). To date, the 
structural relationship between worry and rumination has not been tested to examine whether it 
would be better explained by a bi-factor model.  
The current study examined the relationship between worry and rumination, focusing on 
testing the potential utility of the bi-factor model as an alternative to traditional “common” vs. 
“distinctive” approaches. Specifically, we examined, using confirmatory factor analysis, the fit 
of three models, which are illustrated in Figure 1. First, the single-factor model posits that a 
common factor (negative repetitive thinking) represents all the worry and rumination items.  This 
model is consistent with the recent proposal that worry and rumination share a common process 
that is characterized by negative perseverative thought (McEvoy et al., 2013; Ruscio et al., 2011; 
Watkins, 2008). Next, the two-factor model suggests that worry and rumination are highly 
correlated, but are fundamentally unique constructs (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989). Finally, 
the bi-factor model includes a common factor (negative repetitive thinking) that saturates each 
specific worry and rumination item as well as separate worry-specific and rumination-specific 
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factors that capture unique variance of worry and rumination items. These three factors are 
uncorrelated.  
 Furthermore, to elucidate the nature of the constructs underlying the factors derived from 
the best fitting model, we examined how each of the factors in the best fitting model was 
associated with motivational traits (avoidance and approach temperament) and distinct 
anxiety/depression symptoms. Motivational traits are known to be closely related to individuals’ 
stress responses and coping strategies across a broad range of situations. Considering that worry 
and rumination are a form of cognitive coping in the face of distress, delineating how the 
worry/rumination factors are associated with motivational traits has implications for advancing 
our understanding of their working mechanisms. Specifically, although heightened avoidance 
temperament has been implicated as a common risk factor for both worry and rumination 
(Manfredi et al., 2011), the degree to which this vulnerability factor is associated with the 
common vs. unique aspects of worry and rumination has not been tested. On the other hand, 
approach motivation (or positive temperament) has been associated with the enhanced ability to 
regulate negative emotions and the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies (Hur et al., 2015; 
Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). As such, it is possible that approach motivation may function as a 
protective factor for negative repetitive thinking. The degree to which approach temperament is 
associated with worry and rumination remains an open question, however. In addition, given that 
worry and rumination have been frequently implicated as risk factors for a wide range of 
emotional disorders, it is important to elucidate how specific aspects of negative repetitive 
thinking are associated with anxiety and depression symptoms. Such investigation has the 
potential for advancing both current transdiagnostic and disorder-specific approaches in the 
assessment and treatment of mood and anxiety disorders.  





 Five hundred sixty-four undergraduate students (71% female; mean age = 18.8 years) 
participated in the study for course credit. All participants provided informed consent. The 
research protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. Participants in this study were involved in a large screening project 
examining dimensions of personality and psychopathology. Although there is some overlap 
between the participants and a subset of the measures reported in this paper and those reported in 
Tengshe et al. (in preparation), they examine distinct questions using different approaches. 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
Worry and Rumination 
 Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 
1990). Participants rated how each of 16 statements describes them (e.g., “My worries 
overwhelm me”) on a scale from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical).  The PSWQ has 
excellent test-retest reliability, as well as good convergent and discriminant validity in 
undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Nitschke, 
Heller, Imig, McDonald, & Miller, 2001). There was no missing data and the internal 
consistency in our sample was excellent (α =.94). 
 Rumination was measured using the rumination subscale of Rumination/Reflection 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Previous studies used the Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which primarily assessed individuals’ 
responses to their depressive symptoms, possibly obscuring the relationship between rumination 
and depression. To assess rumination more accurately and precisely, the current study used a 
   
11 
 
rumination questionnaire (RRQ) that minimizes the use of symptom-specific terms. Participants 
rated how each of 12 statements describe them (e.g., “I tend to ruminate or dwell over things that 
happened to me for a really long time afterward”) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The rumination subscale has excellent test-retest reliability and convergent and 
discriminant validity in undergraduate and clinical samples (Ruscio et al., 2011; Segerstrom et al., 
2003). There was one participant with missing data and the internal consistency in our sample 
was excellent (α =.93). 
Approach and Avoidance Temperament 
 In order to measure approach and avoidance temperaments, we used the following three 
questionnaires: the Behavioral Activation and Behavioral Inhibition Scales (Carver & White, 
1994), the Extraversion and Neuroticism sub-scales of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (Costa Jr 
& McCrae, 1992), and the Positive and Negative Temperament sub-scales of the General 
Temperament Survey (Watson & Clark, 1993). Approach motivation is characterized by 
behaviors instigated or directed by a positive/desirable event or possibility, whereas avoidance 
motivation is characterized by behaviors instigated or directed by a negative/undesirable event or 
possibility (Elliot & Thrash, 2002).   
 1) Behavioral Activation and Behavioral Inhibition Scales.  The Behavioral 
Activation Scale (BAS) is composed of 13 items, such as “When I see an opportunity for 
something I like, I get excited right away.”  The Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS) is composed 
of 7 items, such as “If I think something unpleasant is going to happen, I usually get pretty 
‘worked up.’” Each item was rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) scale. The 
reliability and validity of these measures are well-documented (Carver & White, 1994). There 
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were 3 and 7 participants with missing data for the BAS and BIS, respectively. Internal 
consistency in our sample was adequate (α =.75 for BAS, α =.74 for BIS).  
 2) Extraversion and Neuroticism. Two sub-scales of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory 
(Costa Jr & McCrae, 1992) were used to assess extraversion and neuroticism: the 12-item 
Extraversion (NEO-E) and the 12-item Neuroticism (NEO-N) scales. The NEO-E scale consists 
of items such as “I like to be where the action is,” whereas the NEO-N scale consists of items 
such as “When I’m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces.” Each 
item was rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. The reliability and validity 
of these measures are well-established (Costa Jr & McCrae, 1992). There were 4 and 2 
participants with missing data for the NEO-E and NEO-N scales, respectively. Internal 
consistency in our sample was excellent (α =.84 for NEO-E, α =.86 for NEO-N). 
 3) Positive and Negative Emotionality. The following subscales of the General 
Temperament Survey (Watson & Clark, 1993) were used to assess positive and negative 
emotionality: the 27-item Positive Temperament (GTS-PT) and the 28-item Negative 
Temperament (GTS-NT) scales. The GTS-PT consists of items such as “I often feel lively and 
cheerful for no good reason,” whereas the GTS-NT consists of items such as “I can get very 
upset when little things don’t go my way.” Each item was coded 0 (false) or 1 (true). 
The reliability and validity of these measures are well-established (Watson & Clark, 1993). 
There were 48 and 49 participants with missing data for the GTS-PT and GTS-NT scales, 
respectively. Internal consistency in our sample was excellent (α =.90 for GTS-PT, α =.94 for 
GTS-NT). 
Depression and Anxious Arousal Symptoms  
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 Anhedonic depression was measured using the relevant 22-item (e.g., “felt like nothing 
was very enjoyable”, “felt really slowed down”) scale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms 
Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson, Clark, et al., 1995; Watson, Weber, et al., 1995). Anxious 
arousal was measured using the relevant 17-item (e.g., “Startled easily”; “Was trembling or 
shaking”) MASQ scale. Research has indicated that these scales have good convergent and 
discriminant validity in undergraduate and community samples and are psychometrically and 
physiologically distinct constructs from worry (Engels et al., 2007; Engels et al., 2010; Keller et 
al., 2000; Nitschke et al., 2001; Watson et al., 1995). Each item was rated on a 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) scale. There was no missing data for these measures. Internal consistency in our 
sample was good (α =.86 for anxious arousal, α =.78 for anhedonic depression). 
Analytic Strategy  
 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to examine the fit of the three 
worry/rumination models (i.e., single factor, two-factor, and bi-factor model). Model fit was 
evaluated using commonly used fit indices: the chi-square (χ
2
) fit statistic, the comparative fit 
index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The Chi-Square (χ2) 
value is the traditional measure for evaluating overall model fit, assessing the magnitude of 
discrepancy between the sample and fitted covariances matrices (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The CFI 
takes into consideration model complexity and reflects the extent to which the current model fit 
is better than a model in which the variables are constrained to be uncorrelated (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). The RMSEA also accounts for model complexity and reflects the extent to which 
the model-implied covariance matrix fits the predicted population covariance matrix (Hooper, 
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Chi-square values ranging between 2.0 and 5.0 indicate a good 
model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). CFI values greater than .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and 
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RMSEA values less than .08 indicate a good fit to the data, while values less than .05 indicate a 
very good fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Models were fit using the lavaan package 
in R (Rosseel, 2012), treating the data as ordered categorical data using a weighted least squares 
estimator (Muthén, 1984). This was done to accommodate the likelihood of non-equal interval 
lengths in the Likert-scaled data. The χ
2
 difference test was used to directly compare the three 
proposed models and identify the best fitting model.  
 Once the best fitting model was identified, we next used a structural equation modeling 
(SEM) approach to evaluate its descriptive validity by estimating the associations between the 
PSWQ/RRQ factors (derived from the best fitting model) and approach/avoidance temperaments 
and anxiety/depression symptoms. Approach and avoidance temperament latent variables were 
modeled following Elliot and Thrash’s (2002) and Spielberg et al.’s (2011) CFA model. GTS-PT, 
NEO-E, and BAS scales were indicators for approach temperament; GTS-NT, NEO-N, and BIS 
scales were indicators for avoidance temperament. Maximum likelihood estimation was used and 
the factor loadings were derived from the current sample. The latent factors of avoidance and 
approach temperament and the self-reported anxiety/depression symptom measures were 
incorporated into the structural model of PSWQ/RRQ items. This approach has several 
advantages. First, because the PSWQ/RRQ factors are modeled as latent variables, measurement 
errors were controlled for, maximizing the effect sizes with personality latent factors and 
anxiety/depression symptoms. Second, since the structural modeling approach allowed for 
missing data with categorical data using a pairwise present approach, both the information 
obtained from the sample and the sample size were maximized, yielding more accurate 
parameter estimates than listwise deletion (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010). Two analytic 
approaches were used: (1) entering each criterion variable into the model separately; and (2) 
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entering all four criterion variables into the model simultaneously. All analyses were conducted 
using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012).  
RESULTS 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 Table 1 shows the fit statistics and specific details for the competing factor models of the 
PSWQ/RRQ items. Among the three models, the bi-factor model was the best fitting model to 
the data. Specifically, the two-factor model showed an improved fit to the data compared to the 




= 2268.93, p < .001, and the bi-factor model showed an improved fit 




= 518.46, p < .001. This suggests that worry and 
rumination share certain common aspects (negative repetitive thinking) but there are still some 
unique aspects to each. The bi-factor model provides an adequate to good fit for all item sets. 
 Table 2 shows the standardized factor loadings for the bi-factor model for each of the 
PSWQ/RRQ items. Within the bi-factor model, all the PWSQ and RRQ items loaded 
significantly on the common factor (negative repetitive thinking), which indicates that the 
common factor variance accounts for the internal consistency and homogeneity of the 
PSWQ/RRQ items. All PSWQ items loaded significantly on the other factor (worry specific) that 
was orthogonal to the common factor. All RRQ items except one (“My attention is often focused 
on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop thinking about”) loaded significantly on the other factor 
(rumination-specific) that was orthogonal to the common factor.  
Descriptive Validity of the PSWQ/RRQ Factors Model   
 Table 3 shows the structural associations between the PSWQ/RRQ factors and the 
approach/avoidance temperaments and symptom measures. When each criterion variable was 
entered separately, the common factor (negative repetitive thinking) was significantly correlated 
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with all four criterion variables. Specifically, it showed a very strong positive relationship with 
avoidance temperament and a moderate negative relationship with approach temperament. In 
addition, it showed a strong positive relationship with anhedonic depression and a modest 
positive relationship with anxious arousal. The worry-specific factor showed a modest positive 
relationship with both avoidance and approach temperaments and a weak positive relationship 
with anxious arousal. It was not correlated with anhedonic depression. The rumination-specific 
factor showed a weak negative relationship with approach temperament, and was not 
significantly correlated with the other criterion variables. When all four criterion variables were 
entered into the model simultaneously, all the results stayed the same except that the 
significantly negative correlation between the rumination-specific factor and approach 
temperament disappeared.  
DISCUSSION 
 The findings of the present study suggest that the structural relationship between worry 
and rumination is best represented by a bi-factor model. The bi-factor model suggests that worry 
and rumination appear to be comprised of a single factor that captures common variance in 
worry and rumination, as well as separate worry-specific and rumination-specific factors that 
capture unique variance. Without establishing the structural relationship between worry and 
rumination, findings focusing on either the unique aspects of worry and rumination or the 
common functionality are inherently limited. The bi-factor conceptualization provides a 
framework for reconciling the diverging perspectives regarding worry and rumination, 
suggesting the need to pay attention to both common and unique aspects of worry and 
rumination.  
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 Within the bi-factor model, the common factor (negative repetitive thinking) showed a 
strong, positive correlation with avoidance temperament and a moderate, negative correlation 
with approach temperament. Research has proposed the importance of avoidance temperament 
for the development and maintenance of emotional disorders (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004; Hur et 
al., 2015; Spielberg et al., 2011). The present findings suggest that avoidance temperament may 
function as a critical risk factor for negative repetitive thinking. This result is consistent with the 
finding of Ruscio et al. (2011) that pervasive thought, measured by negative thought intrusions 
during a focused breathing task, was positively correlated with negative affective temperament. 
In addition, the present findings suggest that high levels of approach temperament may function 
as a broader, protective factor against negative repetitive thinking. This result is consistent with 
previous research showing that approach motivation is associated with enhanced ability to 
regulate negative emotions and the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as 
reappraisal (Hur et al., 2015; Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). 
 The common factor was also positively correlated with both anxiety and depression 
symptoms, suggesting that negative repetitive thinking represents a common cognitive 
vulnerability for both anxiety and depression. This result is consistent with emerging evidence 
suggesting that negative repetitive thinking is a transdiagnostic process that confers risk for 
multiple emotional disorders and their comorbidity (McEvoy et al., 2013; Ruscio et al., 2011).  
Taken together, it is possible that avoidance temperament and negative repetitive thinking may 
function as distal and proximal risk factors for emotional disorders, respectively.  
 The worry-specific factor was positively correlated with both avoidance and approach 
temperament. Past research has consistently found a link between avoidance temperament and 
worry (Davidson, 2002; Spielberg et al., 2011), but our results suggest that worry is also 
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associated with approach motivation. This result is not only consistent with Spielberg et al.’s 
(2011) finding that worry (measured by PSWQ) is positively associated with approach 
temperament, but also further demonstrates that it is the unique features of worry, above and 
beyond the common factor, that is responsible for the association. This finding also reveals how 
worry is distinct from rumination. Unlike rumination, worry may be a means by which 
individuals cope with uncertainty by attempting to increase their sense of certainty and 
preparedness (Segerstrom et al., 2003). Thus, worry may represent a motivation to avoid 
negative future events, but also involve motivation to approach the situation in order to reduce 
uncertainty. It is also possible that the future oriented process of worry is linked to approach 
motivation. Some cognitive features related to prospection (e.g., simulation, prediction, and 
planning) that are involved in worry may be driven by motivation to achieve personally valued 
future goals (Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). The worry-specific factor was also positively 
correlated with anxiety symptoms, but not with depressive symptoms, which replicates previous 
findings (Beck et al., 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1989).  
 The rumination-specific factor was negatively correlated with approach temperament 
(although this effect disappeared when all criterion variables were entered into the model). This 
result is consistent with previous findings that rumination is linked with behavioral and 
experimental avoidance (Giorgio et al., 2010). It will be important for future research to explore 
other variables that may be associated with the rumination-specific factor.  For example, we 
hypothesize that the rumination-specific factor is associated with: (a) past-oriented negative 
thinking that is characterized by excessive self-criticism and self-blaming; and (b) negatively 
biased interpretation of situations (e.g., minimizing positives, overgeneralizing failure).  These 
characteristics may contribute to reduced self-confidence and optimism, which in turn, lead to 
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low motivation to approach problem situations. In contrast to previous findings that showed 
rumination is specifically linked to depression (Beck et al., 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1989), the 
rumination-specific factor was not correlated with depressive symptoms. Our finding therefore 
suggests that the common process involved in negative repetitive thinking, rather than 
rumination-specific features, is a risk factor for depression.  
 Given that the current findings are based on specific self-report measures (i.e., PSWQ, 
RRQ), future research should examine if the bi-factor model holds using different questionnaires 
or laboratory-based measures (Rapee, 1993; Ruscio et al., 2011). Of course, a great deal of 
research is needed to further our understanding of the nature and significance of the three 
orthogonal factors (i.e., negative repetitive thinking, worry-specific, rumination-specific). It 
would be valuable to explore potential attentional (e.g., deficits in attention control, negative 
attentional bias) and affective (e.g., negative temperament, mood) variables that may contribute 
to each factor. In addition, future research is warranted to examine how motivational contexts 
and individual differences in motivational temperaments confer risk for negative repetitive 
thinking, worry-specific and rumination-specific cognitions, and in turn contribute to the 
development and maintenance of mood and anxiety disorders and their comorbidity. It would be 
also valuable to build on the present research by including positive and neutral repetitive 
thinking (e.g., self-reflection, future-oriented positive thinking) to elucidate the common and 
specific elements for all forms of repetitive thinking. What is learned from such research has the 
potential to be incorporated into transdiagnostic approaches to emotional disorders and to further 
inform the development of more effective and individualized interventions for individuals with 
anxiety and depression.   
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CHAPTER 3  
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR MEASURING THE INITIATION 
AND TERMINATION OF WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 Worry and rumination are examples of maladaptive repetitive thinking that are important 
vulnerability factors for emotional disorders, such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and 
major depressive disorder (MDD) (Ruscio et al., 2011; Smith & Alloy, 2009; Watkins, 2008). 
Worry involves a stream of thoughts and images that are negatively valenced and relatively 
uncontrollable. It is concerned with future events that entail possible negative outcomes 
(Berenbaum, 2010; Borkovec et al., 1983). Rumination is defined as repetitive, self-referential 
thinking on a theme related to personal goals and concerns in the absence of immediate external 
demands that require such thinking (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008). It is mainly about 
past events, especially past loss or failure (Kirkegaard Thomsen, 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008; Papageorgiou, 2006; Segerstrom et al., 2003). 
 Until quite recently, there have been two opposing perspectives regarding the structural 
relationship between worry and rumination. The “traditional view” (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et 
al., 1989) proposes that worry and rumination are distinct constructs, focusing on their unique 
and specific features (e.g., worry concerns future potential threat, whereas rumination concerns 
past loss or failure). In contrast, the “common view” (Segerstrom et al., 2003; Watkins, 2008) 
proposes that worry and rumination represent a common core process of perseverative thought 
and a tendency to engage in negative thinking in a repetitive, uncontrolled manner. These two 
opposing views were recently reconciled by using a bi-factor approach in which worry and 
rumination share certain common aspects, while there remain some unique aspects to each (see 
Chapter 2). Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the structural relationship between worry 
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and rumination was better represented by a bi-factor model than by a single-factor or a two-
factor model (see Chapter 2). The bi-factor conceptualization provides a framework for 
reconciling the diverging perspectives regarding worry and rumination, suggesting the need to 
pay attention to both common and unique aspects of worry and rumination. This model is also 
useful for identifying the psychological correlates of the common and specific components of 
worry and rumination.   
 Research on worry and rumination has focused almost exclusively on the content and 
amount of worrying/ruminating. More recently, however, Berenbaum (2010) proposed an 
initiation–termination (IT) two-phase model of worrying in which the initiation and termination 
phases of worry are differentiated. He argued that worry should not be considered a static entity, 
but should instead be thought of as a dynamic process that unfolds over time (Berenbaum, 2010). 
The IT model suggests that the following three aspects of worrying need more attention: (a) how 
easily worrying is initiated; (b) how easily worrying is terminated; and (c) the pattern of 
worrying over time. Berenbaum (2010) further proposed that each phase is influenced by 
different cognitive-affective factors. An initial test of the IT model of worry using ecological 
momentary assessment found that: (a) worry initiation and termination incrementally predicted 
global worry and GAD symptom severity; and (b) worry initiation and termination were 
differentially associated with worry beliefs and with the perceived costs of undesirable outcomes 
(Berenbaum et al., under review). These results highlight the potential value of distinguishing 
between the initiation and termination of worrying.  
 Although Berenbaum’s (2010) model was formulated in relation to worry, it is possible to 
extend the model to rumination. Similar to worry, it is possible that different cognitive-affective 
factors are associated with the initiation and termination phases of rumination. Regardless of the 
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degree to which the specific predictions made by the IT model prove to be accurate, there can be 
little doubt that the initiation of repetitive thinking can be distinguished from the termination of 
repetitive thinking.  As a result, for the purpose of studying the initiation and termination of 
repetitive thinking, it will be valuable to have tools to measure them.   
 Although questionnaires and interviews are commonly used for assessing worry and 
rumination (Meyer et al., 1990; Sheehan et al., 2001; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), none of them 
differentiates the different phases of worry and rumination. Two alternative strategies for 
capturing the different phases of worry and rumination are laboratory tasks and ecological 
momentary assessment (EMA). Several studies have used laboratory tasks to measure 
individuals’ worry and rumination patterns. For example, repetitive negative thoughts were 
measured via thought sampling during a focused breathing task (FBT; Borkovec et al., 1983; 
Ruscio et al., 2011). During 5 minutes of FBT, participants were signaled four times at varying 
intervals (from 30 to 120 seconds apart); at each signal, they answered a set of questions that 
assessed whether they were engaging in negative thoughts at the moment. Although FBT showed 
good predictive validity (Ruscio et al., 2011), it remains unclear whether what is captured during 
FBT is specific to the ease of initiating negative thoughts, difficulty terminating those thoughts, 
or both. In addition, studies using FBT did not differentiate worry and rumination but rather 
assessed negative automatic thoughts. In other studies (Eysenck, 1984; Rapee, 1993), worry was 
measured during a thinking period during which participants were instructed to simply worry 
about the worry topic they had previously identified. During the 5-minute thinking period, an 
auditory stimulus (e.g., beep sound) was presented every 15 seconds and participants answered 
whether they had been worrying when the signal occurred. Although Eysenck (1984) showed the 
modulation effect by trait NA and state NA on different time points of the worry process (e.g., 
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initial 75 seconds vs. later), his experiment was not designed to capture individual differences in 
worry initiation and termination. These studies did not assess rumination.  
 Another strategy to consider is EMA. Unlike questionnaires and laboratory tasks, which 
are limited by recall bias and not well suited to capture behavioral changes over time and across 
contexts, EMA involves repeated sampling of participants’ behaviors and experiences in real 
time in the contexts in which they naturally occur (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008). Given 
that worry and rumination are cognitive processes that are commonly experienced in real-life 
contexts, using this approach has the potential for more precisely and meaningfully capturing 
individuals’ actual patterns of worry and rumination. Thus far, there has been one study that used 
EMA to measure different phases of worry (Berenbaum et al., submitted). In their study, each 
participant was given a handheld electronic device that delivered prompts by emitting an audible 
beep. Participants were prompted six times per day over the course of one week. At each prompt, 
participants were asked whether they had been worrying about something new since the last 
prompt (an index of ease of worry initiation) or about the same thing they were worried about in 
the last prompt (an index of difficulty with worry termination). Berenbaum et al. found that the 
indices of worry initiation and worry termination incrementally predicted global worry and 
General Anxiety Disorder symptom severity. In their study, rumination was not measured either.   
 In this study, we developed laboratory instruments and EMA measures to enable the 
examination of the initiation and termination of worry and rumination.  We modified an FBT 
task that had been used by Borkovec et al. (1983) and Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) in order to 
capture individual differences in the ease of worry and rumination initiation. We modified 
(Eysenck, 1984; Rapee, 1993) assessment of the worry process as a way to measure participants’ 
difficulty terminating worry and rumination. As an alternative approach, these constructs were 
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also measured using EMA. For EMA, we largely adopted Berenbaum et al.’s (submitted) method 
but expanded it to measure rumination in addition to worry.   
The goal of this study was to examine laboratory and EMA measures of the initiation and 
the termination of both worry and rumination.  We examined how these measures would be 
associated with factor scores derived from the bi-factor model (i.e., common factor, worry-
specific, rumination-specific) using the self-report questionnaires.  In addition we examined how 
these measures would be associated with each other.  We were especially interested in exploring 
the degree to which these two alternative measurement approaches (lab vs. EMA) would 
distinguish between: (a) worry and rumination; and (b) initiation and termination.  
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants were 46 undergraduate students (66.7% female; mean age = 20.3 years). The 
majority of participants (59.1%) were White, followed by 29.5% Asian, and 9.1% African 
American; 2.3% chose to describe themselves as “other.” All participants completed a voluntary 
informed consent at the start of the session and received monetary compensation for their 
participation. The research protocol was approved by the university institutional review board. 
Participants were tested individually.  
Self-Report Questionnaires 
 Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 
1990). Participants rated how each of 16 statements described them (e.g., “My worries 
overwhelm me”) on a scale from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical).  The PSWQ has 
excellent test-retest reliability as well as good convergent and discriminant validity in 
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undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer et al., 1990; Nitschke et al., 2001). There was no 
missing data and the internal consistency in our sample was excellent (α =.90). 
 Rumination was measured using the rumination subscale of Rumination/Reflection 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Participants rated how each of 12 statements 
described them (e.g., I tend to ruminate or dwell over things that happened to me for a really 
long time afterward”) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The rumination 
subscale has excellent test-retest reliability and convergent and discrimination validity in 
undergraduate and clinical samples (Ruscio et al., 2011; Segerstrom et al., 2003). There was no 
missing data and the internal consistency in our sample was good (α =.87). 
 The PSWQ and RRQ were used in confirmatory factor analysis as a means of generating 
common, worry-specific, and rumination specific scores. Based on previous research (see 
Chapter 2), the bi-factor model was fit using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012), treating 
the data as ordered categorical data using a weighted least squares estimator (Muthén, 1984) (see 
Figure 1 in Chapter 2). This model included a common factor (negative repetitive thinking) that 
saturates each specific worry and rumination item as well as separate worry-specific and 
rumination-specific factors that capture unique variance of worry and rumination items. These 
three factors are uncorrelated. Three factor scores (common, worry-specific, and rumination-
specific factors) were extracted with the regression method.  
Laboratory Assessment of Initiation and Termination of Worry/Rumination  
Worry Initiation Task 
 To measure worry initiation, participants engaged in three trials of a quiet time (QT) task, 
each of which was preceded by a brief priming phase. The QT task was adapted from the 
Focused Breathing Task by Borkovec et al. (1983) and Ruscio and Borkovec (2004). During the 
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QT, which lasted one minute, participants were instructed to close their eyes and pay attention to 
their breathing. They were signaled twice (first after 30 seconds, and then again after 1 minute) 
and, at each signal, participants were first asked to indicate whether they had been engaging in 
some thoughts at least some of the time during the preceding 30 seconds. If they answered 
affirmatively, they were asked the following questions: (a) whether these thoughts were positive, 
negative, or neutral; (b) whether what they were thinking about concerned something that 
happened in the past; and (c) whether what they were thinking about something that could 
happen in the future. Participants who indicated that they were thinking about something 
negative that could happen in the future were judged to have initiated worry.   
 A brief priming phase preceded the QT task in order to avoid obtaining skewed data (i.e., 
a lot of individuals showing no initiation of worry) and capture a wide range of initiation 
proneness. The priming phase was composed of reading some bogus statistics and a personal 
narrative. The bogus statistics described high probabilities of the occurrence of negative events. 
It was written in such a way that the statistics were from a survey of undergraduates, and the 
contents involved topics that undergraduates could easily engage in. The personal narrative was a 
short paragraph consisting of a stream of thoughts about possible negative future events. The 
narrative was written in an ambiguous way (in terms of context) to prevent the story from 
invoking any strong emotions. The bogus statistics and personal narratives fell into one of the 
following categories of concern: study/work, social/relationships, and financial, each of which 
varied in topics and contents for each trial.    
 For each trial of the worry initiation task, the ease of worry initiation was measured on a 




 beep; 1 = initiated worry only at 2
nd
 beep; 2 
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= initiated worry only at 1
st




 beeps). The index of ease 
of worry initiation was measured by adding the scores from all three QT trials. 
Rumination Initiation Task 
 The rumination initiation task was almost identical to the worry initiation task, with one 
exception -- the content of the bogus statistics and personal narrative during the priming phase 
differed.  Specifically, the bogus statistics used for the worry initiation task described high 
probabilities of future negative events, whereas the bogus statistics used for the rumination 
initiation task described past negative events. The narrative used for the worry initiation task was 
mostly composed of a chain of thoughts concerning possible future negative events, whereas the 
narrative used for the rumination initiation task was mostly composed of a chain of thoughts 
concerning past negative events. 
 During the QT, participants who indicated that they were thinking about something 
negative that happened in the past were judged to have initiated rumination. For each trial of the 
rumination initiation task, the ease of rumination initiation was measured on a scale from 0 to 3 




 beep; 1 = initiated rumination only at 2
nd
 beep; 2 = initiated 
rumination only at 1
st




 beeps). The index of ease 
of rumination initiation was measured by adding the scores from all three QT trials of QT.  
Worry Termination Task 
 To measure worry termination, participants engaged in two trials of a thinking period, 
during which participants were instructed to worry about their worry topic (see details below). 
The procedure for the thinking period was adapted mainly from Eysenck’s (1984) and Rapee’s 
(1993) assessment of the worry process. Participants were first asked to think of three current 
worries. These worries were to be of moderate and comparable intensity. Participants wrote a 
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brief description of each worry and categorized the content of their worry topics as work/study, 
social/relationships, physical, financial or other. They rated the intensity of each worry on a 100-
point scale ranging from 0 (not worrying at all) to 100 (the most worrying thing you can possibly 
imagine). The experimenter reviewed the three worry topics and chose two that fell within a 
moderate range of intensity (between 40 and 80) and were distinct from each other. Any 
participants who mentioned more than two worries outside this range were asked to think of 
other moderate-intensity worries. 
 The experimenter and the participant then discussed the first worry topic for around 1 
minute to remind the participant of all salient aspects. This process was designed to make sure 
the vast majority of participants began worrying. During the thinking period, which lasted 3 
minutes, participants were instructed to worry about the topic just discussed with their eyes 
closed. Participants were signaled six times (every 30 seconds) at which time they were to 
indicate what they were doing at the time of the signal. At each signal, participants were first 
asked, “Since you started this exercise (or since the last beep), have you been worrying 
continuously?” Participants indicated one of the following: (1) Yes, I have been worrying 
continuously,  (2) No, I stopped worrying, but then I started up worrying again, or (3) No, I 
stopped worrying and did not start again. They were then asked to indicate how much of the time 
they had been worrying on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (the entire time). At the end of the task, 
participants were asked how difficult they found it to stop worrying during the exercise on a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).   
 This whole procedure, which was considered a trial, was repeated for the second worry 
topic. For each trial, a composite score was created by averaging the z-scores of the following 
variables that were highly correlated (correlations ranged from 0.6 to 0.9): the frequency of 
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continuing worrying, the time spent on worrying, and difficulty stopping worrying. The index of 
difficulty with worry termination was measured by adding the composite scores from the two 
trials.  
Rumination Termination Task 
 The rumination termination task was almost identical to the worry termination task 
except for two things. First, instead of indicating worry topics, participants were asked to think 
of three current ruminations: things that happened in the past that currently concern them and 
that they have been dwelling on (e.g., something they did that they wish they had not done and/or 
something they did not do but wish they had). Two of the three rumination topics were selected 
for the rumination termination task (the ones that fell in the moderate range of intensity). During 
the thinking period, participants were instructed to dwell on the topic previously identified with 
their eyes closed.  
 Second, the questions asked during the thinking period differed. At each signal, 
participants were first asked, “Since you started this exercise (or since the last beep), have you 
been thinking continuously about something negative that happened in the past?” Participants 
indicated one of the following: (1) Yes, I have been dwelling on what happened in the past 
continuously, (2) No, I stopped thinking about what happened in the past, but then I started it up 
again, or (3) No, I stopped thinking about what happened in the past and did not start again. They 
were then asked how much of the time they had been dwelling on something negative that 
happened in the past on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (the entire time). At the end of the task, 
participants were asked how difficult they found it to stop thinking about something negative that 
happened in the past on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
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 This whole procedure, which was considered a trial, was repeated for the second 
rumination topic. For each trial, a composite score was created by averaging the z-scores of the 
following variables that were highly correlated (correlations ranged from 0.6 to 0.9): the 
frequency of continual ruminating, the time spent on ruminating, and the difficulty to stop 
ruminating. The index of difficulty with rumination termination was measured by adding the 
composite scores from the two trials.  
Ecological Momentary Assessment of Initiation and Termination of Worry/Rumination 
 Survey signals were generated using Qualtrics software (2005, Provo) and were delivered 
as a text message through participants’ smartphones. The text message contained a survey link 
that included a series of questions about worry and rumination. Participants were prompted six 
times per day over the course of five consecutive days. Participants were allowed to choose the 
time frame (8am – 11pm, 9am – 12pm, 10am – 1am or 11am – 2am) they would prefer, all of 
which covered 15 hours per day. Prompts were randomly dispersed within two and a half hour 
time periods throughout the day, such that one message would occur within every two and a half 
hour time period (i.e., one message between 10AM – 12:30PM, and the next message sent 
between 12:30PM – 3PM, etc). Prompts occurred as few as 150 and as many as 198 minutes 
apart (M = 181, SD = 32). Participants were given up to 20 minutes to respond to each prompt 
and subsequent series of questions. When participants did not respond, the survey link for that 
prompt expired, recording missing data for that prompt. Participants responded to between 13 
and 30 prompts (M = 24.6, SD = 4.0) out of a total of 30 prompts. Response rate to prompts was 
not significantly correlated with either PSWQ (r = .18, p > .2) or RRQ (r = .22, p > .1) scores.  
 At each prompt, participants were asked a set of worry and rumination related questions. 
The order of questions (worry vs. rumination) was counterbalanced. For worry, participants were 
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first asked whether they had worried at any time since the last prompt. If they had worried, 
participants were asked: (a) during the most recent block of time (since the last message), 
whether they started worrying about anything new that they had not been worrying about during 
the preceding block of time (0 = no, 1 = yes); (b) during the most recent block of time (since the 
last message), whether they continued worrying about something that they had already been 
worrying about during the preceding block of time (1 = No, I have not been worrying about 
anything that I had already been worrying about during the preceding block of time; 2 = Yes, I 
have been worrying about something that I had already been worrying about during the 
preceding block of time, but it has been off and on; 3 = Yes, I have been worrying about 
something that I had already been worrying about during the preceding block of time, and I have 
worried about it continuously); (c) since the last message, how difficult it has been to stop 
worrying (0 = not at all difficult to 5 = I was unable to stop worrying); and (d) since the last 
message, how much of the time had they been worrying?” (0 = never to 4 =all of the time).  
 Due to the nature of the questions asked (using the time frame of “since the last 
message”), the first prompted message of the day did not include question (a) or question (b). 
The first question asked (i.e., whether they worried since they woke up) was instead used for 
assessing the initiation of worry. If participants reported not having worried since the last 
message, they were asked the same questions, but regarding the last time they had worried. 
These responses were not included in the analyses; they were included to discourage participants 
from reporting they had not worried as a strategy to have to answer fewer questions.   
 The proportion of prompts on which participants had new worries (question a), which 
was adjusted based on the number of prompts to which they responded, was used as an index of 
ease of worry initiation. As an index of difficulty with worry termination, a composite score was 
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created by averaging the z-scores of the following variables that were highly correlated 
(correlations ranged from 0.6 to 0.8): 1) proportion of prompts on which they had continuing 
worries (question b), adjusted based on the number of prompts responded to, 2) difficulty 
stopping worrying (question c), and 3) the time spent worrying (question d).  
 The rumination questions were structured in the exact same way. First participants were 
asked whether they had ruminated at any time since the last prompt. If they had ruminated,  
participants were asked the following questions: (a) during the most recent block of time (since 
the last message), whether they started ruminating about anything new that they had not been 
worrying about during the preceding block of time (0 = no, 1 = yes); (b) during the most recent 
block of time (since the last message), whether they continued ruminating about something that 
they had already been ruminating about during the preceding block of time (1 = No, I have not 
been ruminating about anything that I had already been ruminating about during the preceding 
block of time; 2 = Yes, I have been ruminating about something that I had already been 
ruminating about during the preceding block of time, but it has been off and on; 3 = Yes, I have 
been ruminating about something that I had already been ruminating about during the preceding 
block of time, and I have ruminated about it continuously); (c) since the last message, how 
difficult has it been to stop ruminating (0 = not at all difficult to 5 = I was unable to stop 
ruminating); and (d) since the last message, how much of the time have they been ruminating? (0 
= never to 4 = all of the time).   
 The proportion of prompts on which participants reported new ruminations (question a), 
adjusted based on the number of prompts to which they responded, was used as an index of ease 
of rumination initiation. As an index of difficulty with rumination termination, a composite score 
was created by averaging the z-scores of the following variables that were highly correlated 
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(correlations ranged from 0.6 to 0.8): 1) proportion of prompts on which they had continuing 
ruminations (question b), adjusted based on the number of prompts responded to, 2) difficulty to 
stop ruminating (question c), and 3) the time spent on ruminating (question d).  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used. As mentioned, worry 
termination was measured by creating a composite score of the z-scores of 1) frequency of 
continual worrying, 2) the time spent on worrying, and 3) the difficulty to stop worrying.  
Rumination termination was measured by creating a composite score of the z-scores of 1) 
frequency of continual ruminating, 2) the time spent on ruminating, and 3) the difficulty to stop 
ruminating. The following final variables were positively skewed and thus log-transformed: Lab 
rumination initiation, EMA worry initiation, EMA rumination initiation, EMA rumination 
termination.  
Correlations Between LAB/EMA Measures and Factor Scores From Bi-factor Model 
 We first examined the relationship between each measure from the LAB and EMA and 
the factor scores derived from the bi-factor model (i.e., common factor, worry-specific, 
rumination-specific) using the self-report measures to assess the degree to which LAB/EMA 
worry and rumination measures tap into the common vs. specific factors of worry and rumination. 
As can be seen in Table 5, in general, LAB measures, compared to EMA measures, showed 
better specificity in measuring worry vs. rumination features. That is, LAB worry measures of 
initiation and termination were highly correlated with a worry-specific factor, but not with a 
rumination-specific factor. LAB rumination measures of initiation and termination were highly 
correlated with a rumination-specific factor, but not with a worry-specific factor.  
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 On the other hand, EMA worry measures of initiation and termination were most highly 
correlated with a repetitive thinking factor (as opposed to worry-specific and rumination-specific 
factors,) although EMA worry termination showed a higher correlation with a worry-specific 
factor score than with a rumination-specific factor. EMA rumination termination was highly 
correlated with both repetitive thinking and rumination-specific factors. EMA rumination 
initiation was not correlated with any of the bi-factor scores.  
Correlations Between LAB and EMA Measures  
 We next examined the relationship among and between LAB and EMA initiation and 
termination measures.  As can be seen in Table 6, LAB measures did not show good specificity 
in measuring the initiation vs. termination phases of worry and rumination.  For example, LAB 
worry initiation was strongly correlated with LAB worry termination and LAB rumination 
initiation was strongly correlated with LAB rumination termination. On the other hand, EMA 
measures showed good specificity in measuring the initiation vs. termination phases of worry 
and rumination. The strongest correlations were found between EMA worry initiation and 
rumination initiation and between EMA worry termination and rumination termination. EMA 
worry initiation was not significantly correlated with EMA worry termination; and EMA 
rumination initiation was not significantly correlated with rumination termination.  
 When compared across LAB and EMA measures, the only measure that showed good 
specificity of tapping initiation vs. termination was the LAB rumination termination task; LAB 
rumination termination was highly correlated with EMA rumination termination but not with 
EMA rumination initiation.  On the other hand, other tasks show less specificity. For example, 
LAB worry termination was highly correlated with EMA worry termination but it was also 
highly correlated with EMA worry initiation. LAB worry initiation was more strongly correlated 
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with EMA worry termination than with EMA worry initiation. LAB rumination initiation did not 
show significant correlation with either EMA rumination initiation or termination. 
DISCUSSION 
 Based on Berenbaum’s (2010) IT model, two alternative measures (i.e., LAB and EMA) 
were developed to assess the initiation and termination phases of worry and rumination. We 
explored the utility of these measures by examining 1) their ability to measure worry vs. 
rumination specific features, and 2) specificity in tapping initiation vs. termination phases of 
worry and rumination. The results of this research highlight the potential value of these new 
measurements as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses.  
 The LAB measure showed good specificity in measuring worry vs. rumination. This may 
reflect the fact that there were clear procedures in the LAB tasks that elicited thoughts that were 
specific to worry vs. rumination. For example, the LAB worry initiation task involved a story 
prompt that consisted of thoughts concerning a future threat, whereas the LAB rumination 
initiation task involved a story prompt that consisted of thoughts concerning past loss or failure. 
The LAB worry termination task involved an explicit instruction to help participants engage in 
their worry topics, whereas the LAB rumination termination task involved instruction to help 
them engage in their rumination topics. On the other hand, the LAB tasks did not show good 
specificity in measuring the initiation vs. termination phases of worry and rumination, as 
indicated by the high correlations between the initiation and termination scores for both worry 
and rumination. It is possible that the current measurements for the initiation and termination 
processes tap into some common underlying factors (e.g., avoidance tendency, distractibility, 
negative temperament), rather than specific factors unique to each process. It is also possible that 
initiation and termination processes by nature are not entirely independent of each other and are 
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intertwined, which makes it difficult to separate one from another.  Compared to LAB measures, 
EMA measures showed less specificity in measuring worry vs. rumination specific features. 
Although this result could be due to measurement errors involved in EMA (e.g., participants’ 
insufficient understanding of the distinction between worry vs. rumination), it is also possible 
that worry and rumination are not separable in nature, and EMA captures how they actually work. 
In reality, rumination triggers worry and vice versa, and such interaction occurs in a very 
dynamic and subtle manner, making it difficult to separate them.  On the other hand, EMA 
measures showed relatively good specificity in measuring the initiation vs. termination phases of 
worry and rumination. This result may be due to the kinds of questions used to measure initiation 
vs. termination. For example, unlike LAB tasks, for initiation of worry participants were asked 
whether they started worrying about a new topic between the times when the messages were sent, 
whereas, for termination of worry, participants were asked whether they continued to worry 
about the same topic that they had been worrying about. Thus, the frequency in initiating new 
worry topics may have been a key factor that needed to be measured in order to differentiate 
initiation vs. termination phases of worry. It is also possible that the EMA is inherently a better 
approach than the laboratory tasks for more precisely capturing an individual’s natural pattern of 
initiation vs. termination of worry and rumination.   
 The present study was limited by its modest sample size.  As a result, the interpretation of 
the results using factor scores derived from the bi-factor model needs to be done with caution, 
for example. Future research needs to replicate this finding with larger sample sizes. This would 
allow us to explore the different factors contributing to the initiation and termination of worry 
and rumination, such as negative interpretation bias and desire for certainty. Second, given that 
worry and rumination are important features of anxiety disorders and depression, research with a 
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clinical sample is warranted. Doing so would enable us to capture a broader range of worry and 
rumination patterns among individuals and to make claims about psychopathology related to 
these thinking patterns.  
 The LAB and EMA measures showed relative strengths and weaknesses. The LAB 
measures were better at assessing worry vs. rumination specific features than was EMA, whereas 
the EMA measures were better at assessing initiation vs. termination phases of worry and 
rumination. Future research can incorporate this information to improve both measurements. For 
example, it would be worth experimenting with different sampling periods with EMA (e.g., how 
many days, the interval between signals) to determine the most effective ways of capturing 
individuals’ natural patterns of worry and rumination. It is also possible that worry and 
rumination are better captured using different kinds of experience sampling methods. For 
example, instead of using the signal contingent method (a beep notifies participants to record 
data) that we used, the event-contingent method, in which participants record data when worry 
and rumination occurs, may better capture individual differences in worry and rumination 
patterns in real-life contexts. Finally, more research and discussion is needed in regards to how 
to conceptualize and operationalize the initiation and termination of worry and rumination. For 
example, it would be worthwhile to consider conceptualizing the initiation and termination 
phases of worry and rumination as an interactive process in which negative repetitive thoughts 
influence each other, and developing measurements that can capture such dynamic processes. In 
doing so, the use of psychophysiological measures (e.g., EEG, fMRI) could help assess changes 
in neural activities so as to index the initiation, disengagement, and re-initiation of worrisome 
and ruminative thoughts over time. Despite its limitations, the results of this study highlight the 
potential value of developing novel tasks to distinguish the initiation and termination of worry 
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and rumination while paying attention to the utility of the measures in measuring worry vs. 
rumination specific features.  
   
  




ATTENTIONAL AND AFFECTIVE MECHANISMS IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF 
WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 Worry and rumination are examples of maladaptive repetitive thinking that are important 
vulnerability factors for emotional disorders, such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and 
major depressive disorder (MDD) (Ruscio et al., 2011; Smith & Alloy, 2009; Watkins, 2008). A 
growing body of research suggests a close link between attention and worry and rumination. 
Despite its clinical significance, thus far, only loosely connected and scattered evidence exists to 
explain the attentional mechanisms associated with worry and rumination (Von Hippel et al., 
2008). The goal of this paper is to examine the common and distinctive attentional mechanisms 
associated with worry and rumination while considering potential moderation of negative 
temperament.  
 Two critical aspects of attention processes that might be related to worry and rumination 
are attention bias to negative information and executive functions. Attentional bias is the 
tendency to attend to salient emotional information when presented concurrently with neutral 
stimuli. Executive functions (EFs) are defined as a set of higher-order cognitive processes 
responsible for purposeful, goal-directed behaviors (Gioia, Isquith, & Guy, 2001; Miyake et al., 
2000). Theories of executive function suggest that executive function is multi-dimensional and 
can be parsed into three distinctive domains: inhibition, shifting, and updating (e.g., Miyake et al., 
2000). Inhibition is defined as the ability to suppress automatic or prepotent responses, shifting is 
the ability to switch between multiple tasks or mental sets, and updating is the ability to monitor 
and manipulate working memory representations (Miyake et al., 2000). Whereas biased 
attentional processing is an automatic and involuntary response (e.g. to threat cues) that draws 
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attention in a bottom-up manner, executive functions are effortful and carry out more voluntary 
attentional functions that are related to the goal-directed, top-down attentional system (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012).  
 Deficits in executive function have been implicated in both worry and rumination. For 
example, impaired performance on attention control tasks was associated with the increased 
frequency of intrusive thoughts (Verwoerd et al., 2008; Wessel et al., 2008). Similarly, 
individuals with great working memory capacity showed enhanced suppression of negative 
thoughts (C. Brewin & Beaton, 2002; C. R. Brewin & Smart, 2005). Furthermore, Bredemeier 
and Berenbaum (2013) found that working memory deficits predicted changes in levels of worry 
over time, suggesting that working memory impairment may function as a risk factor for 
excessive worry. Rumination has also been associated with deficits in executive functions (Von 
Hippel, Vasey, Gonda, & Stern, 2008; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Even after controlling for 
depressive symptoms, rumination was associated with perseverative tendencies on the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), leading the researchers to link rumination 
with “attentional inflexibility.” Though the functions most frequently related to depression and 
rumination are inhibition and set shifting (Koster et al., 2011), some studies have found that 
rumination is associated with a deficit in inhibition rather than set-switching (De Lissnyder, 
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Despite scattered evidence 
pointing to EF deficits in worry and rumination, these studies did not assess different kinds of 
executive functions or examine both worry and rumination in the same study, making it difficult 
to conclude whether worry and rumination are associated with similar or distinctive executive 
functions.  
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 Worry and rumination have also been implicated in attentional bias to negative 
information. Worry, in particular, has been conceptualized as repeated ideation focused on to-be-
avoided threats (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Attention bias to threat has been associated with 
anxiety disorders, including GAD. For example, compared to controls, individuals with GAD 
showed longer latencies to name the colors of threat words than neutral words, indicating that 
their attention is automatically grabbed by threat-related information (Becker et al., 2001; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). Although chronic worry is a 
defining feature of GAD, evidence coming from GAD studies cannot be generalized to worry 
since they did not differentiate worry from emotional components of the anxiety response 
involved in GAD. It is generally unclear whether worry plays any role distinct from general 
anxiety in attentional bias. To my knowledge, only a couple of studies have examined a direct 
relationship between worry and attention bias to threat by employing an attention modification 
approach to demonstrate that attentional bias causally impacts worry or negative automatic 
thoughts (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010). For example, 
high worriers were randomly assigned to either a training condition in which participants were 
trained either to attend away from threat information or to attend toward neutral information, and 
found that the former group (who were trained to attend away from threat) displayed 
significantly fewer negative thought intrusions after the training. However, these studies either 
pre-selected participants based on their worry scores (e.g., recruiting moderate or high worriers) 
or did not assess worry per se, rather assessing negative automatic thoughts. Thus, although there 
is evidence linking worry with attention bias to threat, additional work is necessary to determine 
the nature of the relationship.  
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 Though attentional bias to mood-congruent information has been demonstrated in people  
with depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 
2005), only a few studies have examined the direct relationship between rumination and 
attentional bias. These studies found rumination to be associated with bias to mood-congruent 
stimuli (e.g., sad faces), even after controlling for depressive symptoms (Donaldson et al., 2007; 
Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006). In addition, individuals with high trait rumination showed 
increased amygdala activity to negative stimuli compared to controls (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2002). One important limitation in this line of literature, however, stems from 
a narrow conceptualization of rumination. Previously, rumination has been defined as “behaviors 
and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of 
those symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Thus, studies investigating attentional bias in 
rumination have focused on how “dysphoric” stimuli are processed. However, rumination can be 
more broadly conceptualized as a response to failure in satisfactorily progressing toward a goal 
(Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993; Smith & Alloy, 2009) and is not limited to depressive 
symptoms. Nonetheless, no studies thus far have investigated a potential link between rumination 
and attention bias to loss/failure. 
 In order to understand the precise mechanisms linking attentional processes to worry and 
rumination, it is important to consider the potential modulation effect of affective factors, such as 
negative temperament. Negative temperament, defined as a tendency to experience negative 
emotions such as anxiety, anger, guilt, and depressed mood (Watson & Clark, 1984), has been 
shown to modulate attentional processes (Crocker et al., 2012; Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011; 
Hur et al., 2015). Neural research suggests the attention networks are strongly modulated by 
brain systems involved in the processing of emotions, reward, and stress (Crocker et al., 2012; 
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Dolcos et al., 2011; Hur et al., 2015; Pessoa, 2009; Rosseel, 2012). Negative temperament, in 
particular, has been shown to exacerbate the impairing effect of negative stimuli on cognitive 
control (Hur et al., 2015), suggesting that the likelihood of observing impaired cognitive control 
in negative contexts depends on a preexisting vulnerability conferred by high negative 
temperament. Considering worry and rumination as a reaction to internal or external negative 
stimuli (e.g., stress, memory), it is possible that elevated negative temperament activates the 
existing vulnerability in executive function to have an impairing effect on thought regulating 
processes. Despite the close association between negative temperament and executive processes, 
most studies investigating the mechanisms of worry and rumination have only examined one of 
these factors (i.e., either executive function or negative temperament), making it difficult to draw 
conclusions about their additive or interactive effects.  It is conceivable that worry and 
rumination are influenced by interactions between executive function and negative temperament.  
 The studies reviewed thus far have investigated attentional mechanisms involved in 
worry and rumination and have focused almost exclusively on the amount of 
worrying/ruminating. More recently, however, Berenbaum (2010) proposed an initiation–
termination (IT) two-phase model of worrying in which the initiation and termination phases of 
worry are differentiated. He argued that worry should not be considered a static entity, but 
should instead be thought of as a dynamic process that unfolds over time (Berenbaum, 2010). 
The IT model suggests that the following three aspects of worrying need more attention: (a) how 
easily worrying is initiated; (b) how easily worrying is terminated; and (c) the pattern of 
worrying over time. An initial test of the IT model of worry using ecological momentary 
assessment found that: (a) worry initiation and termination incrementally predict global worry 
and GAD symptom severity; and (b) worry termination, but not worry initiation, is associated 
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with emotion-induced blindness, an index of the difficulty in disengaging from emotional 
distractors (Berenbaum et al., under review). These results highlight the potential value of 
distinguishing between the initiation and termination of worrying. Recently, Hur and Berenbaum 
extended this model to rumination (see Chapter 3).  Further, they developed laboratory 
instruments to measure worry initiation, worry termination, rumination initiation, and rumination 
termination.  
 Except for a few theoretical proposals that implicate the importance of differentiating the 
phases of mental processes (Berenbaum, 2010; Eysenck, 1984), no studies thus far have 
empirically examined the attentional and affective mechanisms involved in the initiation and 
termination processes of both worry and rumination. In order to advance our understanding of 
the mechanisms involved in worry and rumination, it is important to investigate common and 
distinctive attentional processes involved in the initiation and termination of worry and 
rumination while considering the potential influence of affective factors, such as negative 
temperament. I hypothesized that worry is associated with attentional bias to threat whereas 
rumination is associated with attentional bias to loss/failure. In addition, I hypothesized that 
termination of worry and rumination are influenced by executive functions (e.g., inhibition, 
switching ability) which are further modulated by negative temperament.  
METHODS 
Participants 
 Participants were 223 undergraduate students (69.8% female; mean age = 18.9 years). 
The majority of participants (59.0%) were White, followed by 19.5% Asian, 11.8% African 
American, and 5.2% biracial; 4.5% chose to describe themselves as “other.” All participants 
completed a voluntary informed consent at the start of the session and received monetary 
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compensation for their participation. The research protocol was approved by the university 
institutional review board. Participants were tested individually.  
Self-Report Questionnaires 
 Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 
1990). Participants rated how each of 16 statements described them (e.g., “My worries 
overwhelm me”) on a scale from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical).  The PSWQ has 
excellent test-retest reliability as well as good convergent and discriminant validity in 
undergraduate and clinical samples (Meyer et al., 1990; Nitschke et al., 2001). There was no 
missing data and the internal consistency in our sample was excellent (α =.93). 
 Rumination was measured using the rumination subscale of Rumination/Reflection 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Participants rated how each of 12 statements 
described them (e.g., I tend to ruminate or dwell over things that happened to me for a really 
long time afterward”) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The rumination 
subscale has excellent test-retest reliability and convergent and discrimination validity in 
undergraduate and clinical samples (Ruscio et al., 2011; Segerstrom et al., 2003). There was no 
missing data and the internal consistency in our sample was good (α =.90). 
 The PSWQ and RRQ were used in confirmatory factor analysis as a means of generating 
common, worry-specific, and rumination specific scores. Based on previous research (see 
Chapter 2), the bi-factor model was fit using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012), treating 
the data as ordered categorical data using a weighted least squares estimator (Muthén, 1984) (see 
Figure 1 in Chapter 2). This model included a common factor (negative repetitive thinking) that 
saturates each specific worry and rumination item as well as separate worry-specific and 
rumination-specific factors that capture unique variance of worry and rumination items. These 
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three factors are uncorrelated. Three factor scores (common, worry-specific, and rumination-
specific factors) were extracted with the regression method.  
 The Negative Temperament subscale of the General Temperament Survey (GTS) (D. 
Watson & Clark, 1993) was used to assess negative temperament. Participants were instructed to 
decide whether statements mostly described them and to rate each item as true/false. The 
Negative Temperament subscale includes 28 items such as “I sometimes get all worked up as I 
think about things that happened during the day.” Prior research attests to the reliability and 
validity of this measure (D. Watson & Clark, 1993). Internal consistency in our sample was good 
(α = 0.86). 
Lab measures of Worry and Rumination  
 We developed four different laboratory tasks to measure the following constructs: worry 
initiation, worry termination, rumination initiation, and rumination termination. See the Methods 
section of Chapter 3 for more details.  
Measures of Attention Bias  
 A total of 253 pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and from a sorted source on the web. We selected 
pictures that potentially fall in one of the following stimulus types: physical threat/danger (e.g., 
man with knife), loss/failure (e.g., people crying), and neutral (e.g., woman reading). These 
pictures were rated independently by seven raters using the Valence and Arousal scales of the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley and Lang, 1994) which ranged from 1 (low pleasure, 
low arousal) to 9 (high pleasure, high arousal). Each picture was rated on two additional scales, 
physical threat/danger and loss/failure, on a scale of 1 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely 
relevant). Pictures were categorized as physical threat/danger if they received an average rating 
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of greater than 3.5 on the physical threat/danger scale, less than 2.5 on the loss/failure scale, and 
less than 3.5 on the valence scale. Pictures were categorized as loss/failure if they received an 
average rating of greater than 3.5 on the loss/failure scale, less than 2.5 on the physical 
threat/danger scale, and less than 3.5 on the valence scale. Finally, pictures were categorized as 
neutral if they received an average rating of less than 2.5 on both physical threat/danger and 
loss/failure scales, and higher than 4.5 on the valence scale. These selection criteria resulted in 
the selection of 120 pictures (48 from the IAPS; 72 from the web); 24 pictures for physical 
threat/danger, 24 pictures for loss/failure, and 72 pictures for neutral. The descriptive statistics of 
the physical thereat/danger, loss/failure, valence, and arousal ratings are reported in Appendix A. 
Another 24 neutral pictures were selected for the practice trials. In line with the procedure of 
Mogg et al. (2000), three types of stimulus pairs were created: physical threat/danger – neutral 
(24 pairs), loss/failure – neutral (24 pairs), neutral – neutral (24 pairs). The pictures were 
carefully matched with respect to valence and arousal ratings and the presence of a person and 
concreteness.  Pictures had a height of 4.6 cm and a mean width of 6.5 cm. The dot-probe task 
was programmed and presented using E-Prime (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
 Each of the 48 emotion picture pairs (physical threat/danger, loss/failure) was presented 
four times and each of the 24 neutral picture pairs was presented two times, for a total of 240 
trials, which were presented in a new, fully randomized order for each participant. Each trial 
started with a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. Then, two pictures appeared, 
one 2.2 cm above and one 2.2 cm below, the center of the screen for 500 ms. Following the 
offset of the pictures, a blank screen showed for 14 ms and a single dot or a double dot (target) 
appeared in the center of the screen location where one of the pictures had been and remained on 
the screen until the participant pressed one of the two keys on the keyboard to indicate whether 
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the target is a single dot or a double dot. The accuracy and latency of each response was recorded. 
The inter-trial interval was one of the following, in a random order: 500, 750, 1000, and 1250 ms. 
The emotional stimulus pictures (physical threat/danger, loss/failure) appeared in the upper and 
the lower positions with equal probability, with the matched neutral picture of each pair 
appearing in the other position. The target (a dot or a double dot) was also presented in both 
positions with equal probability.  
 Participants were told that the target could appear in the upper or lower position on the 
screen and were instructed to indicate whether the target was a single dot or a double dot as 
quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the left arrow key if the target was a single dot 
and by pressing the right arrow key if the target was a double dot. Participants first completed 12 
practice trials before completing the actual task.  
Measures of Executive Function  
 The task-switching paradigm (Mayr & Keele, 2000) was used to obtain an index of set-
switching and an index of inhibition of previously relevant information. In this task, participants 
were instructed to identify the spatial location of a deviant object among four rectangles arranged 
into a 2 x 2 matrix. The rectangles varied on one of the following three dimensions: size, motion, 
or orientation. A centrally presented cue, which was presented briefly before the rectangles 
appear, identified the dimension that should be used to identify the rectangular that differs from 
the others. The location of the deviant rectangle was random. Responses were made using keys 
that have the same spatial position on the number pad as the rectangles on the screen (i.e., keys 
“1,” “2,” “4,” “5”).  
 There were four different types of trials: inhibitory, repeat, control, and unclassified trials. 
The trial type is determined by the relation between the final trial and the preceding one or two 
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trials. Inhibitory trials are defined as those in which the cue is different from the cue on the 
immediately preceding trial (n – 1) but the same as the cue two trials back (n – 2). Control trials 
are defined as those in which the cue is different from the cue on the preceding two trials, which 
also have different cues from each other. Repeat trials are defined as those in which the same 
task set is used as the previous trial. Unclassified trials are defined as those in which the cue is 
different from the cue on the preceding trial, which is preceded by the trial using the same cue. 
Non-inhibitory trials include control, repeat, and unclassified trials.  
 RTs were used as an index of performance. Set-switching cost was measured by the RT 
difference between non-inhibitory trials (control and unclassified trials) and repeat trials. The 
larger the difference, the worse switching ability. Inhibition ability was measured by the RT 
difference between inhibitory trials and control trials. Both control and inhibitory trials were 
preceded by at least two task switches. In order to not be confounded by switching abilities, 
inhibition was measured by the extra time involved in switching back to a recently abandoned 
task set compared to a less recently abandoned task set. The larger the difference, the better 
inhibition ability.   
Procedures 
 We used a within-subject design in which participants completed all of the following 
tasks: four laboratory tasks measuring the initiation and termination of worry and rumination, 
dot-probe task, task-switching paradigm, and questionnaires. To minimize fatigue and potential 
transfer effects between tasks, the study was conducted in two separate sessions, each held on a 
different day. The order of tasks were counterbalanced, such that half of the participants 
completed rumination lab tasks on the first day while completing the worry lab tasks on the 
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second day, and the other half started with worry tasks. The order of administering 
questionnaires and attention tasks was also randomized. 
RESULTS 
Data Preparation 
Dot-probe task. Data from 3 participants were removed from analysis because their overall 
accuracy was less than 80%. After exclusion, overall accuracy was 96.5 (SD = 0.03) %. We 
excluded from analysis trials in which the RTs were shorter than 200 ms, exceeded 2,500 ms, 
were 3SDs above each participant’s mean, or were incorrect.  
 Attention bias indices were calculated for each stimulus type (i.e., physical threat/danger 
and loss/failure) using MacLeod and Mathews' (1988) method where RTs on congruent trials are 
subtracted from RTs on incongruent trials. Thus, an index for attention bias to physical 
threat/danger was created by subtracting RTs on congruent trials from RTs on incongruent trials 
for physical/danger stimuli (i.e., Threat/danger Incongruent RTs – Threat/danger Congruent 
RTs). A positive attention bias score indicates attention toward the threatening pictures, a 
negative attentional bias score indicates avoidance of threat, and zero indicates no attentional 
bias. Similarly, an index for attention bias to loss/failure was created by subtracting RTs on 
congruent trials from RTs on incongruent trials for loss/failure stimuli (i.e., Loss/Failure 
Incongruent RTs – Loss/Failure Congruent RTs).  
Task-switching paradigm. Overall accuracy was 96.9 (SD = 0.03) %. In accordance with the 
methods used by Mayr and Keele (2000), we excluded from analysis trials in which the RTs 
exceeded 2,500 ms, incorrect trials, and the two trials after each incorrect trial. As mentioned 
above, set-switching cost was measured by the RT difference between non-inhibitory trials 
(control, repeat, and unclassified trials) and repeat trials.  




 Table 7(a) shows descriptive statistics for all the laboratory variables. Lab worry 
initiation and Lab rumination initiation measures were positively skewed and thus log-
transformed. Descriptive statistics of attention bias indices and executive function scores (i.e., 
inhibition, switching cost) are reported in Table 7(b).  
Correlations between Lab Measures of Worry and Rumination and Bi-Factor Scores 
 Correlations between laboratory measures of worry and rumination and the factor scores 
derived from the bi-factor model (i.e., common factor, worry-specific, and rumination-specific) 
using the self-report measures were examined to assess the degree to which lab worry/rumination 
measures tap into common vs. specific factors of worry and rumination. As shown in Table 8, all 
four lab measures were most strongly correlated with the common factor, that is, repetitive 
negative thinking. Rumination initiation was also significantly correlated with the rumination-
specific factor, but negatively correlated with the worry-specific factor. Worry termination was 
significantly correlated with the worry-specific factor, but not with the rumination-specific factor.  
Correlations between Attention Measures and Worry/Rumination Measures 
 As shown in Table 9, worry initiation was negatively correlated with attention bias to 
threat, such that the more avoidance of threat, the greater the likelihood of initiating worry. 
Though not significant (p = .08), worry termination was also negatively correlated with attention 
bias to threat. Neither worry initiation nor worry termination was correlated with attention bias to 
loss/failure. Rumination termination was positively correlated with attention bias to loss/failure, 
such that the more orienting towards loss/failure, the greater the difficulty terminating 
rumination; rumination termination was not correlated with attention bias to threat. Rumination 
initiation was not correlated with either attention bias to loss/failure or attention bias to threat.  
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None of the lab measures of worry and rumination was significantly correlated with executive 
function measures (i.e., inhibition, switching cost).  
 None of the factor scores derived from the bi-factor model (i.e., common factor, worry-
specific, and rumination-specific) using the self-report measures were significantly correlated 
with any of the attention measures.   
Negative Temperament (NT) Modulates the Relationship between Executive Function and 
Worry/Rumination  
 We examined whether specific executive functions would predict different phases of 
worry and rumination via its interaction with negative temperament. As seen in Table 10 (a), the 
relationship between inhibition function and rumination termination was modulated by negative 
temperament, ΔR
2
 = .03, F(1, 217) = 7.56, p < .01. We further examined this interaction 
following Aiken and West (1991). As depicted in Figure 2, among individuals with high negative 
temperament, there was a trend for inhibition ability to be negatively associated with difficulty 
terminating rumination (i.e., the greater inhibition ability, the easier it was to terminate 
rumination), β = -.16, p = .09. In contrast, among individuals with low negative temperament, 
inhibition ability was positively associated with difficulty terminating rumination (i.e., the 
greater inhibition ability, the harder it was to terminate rumination), β = .17, p = .03.  
 As seen in Table 10 (b), the relationship between switching cost and worry initiation was 
modulated by negative temperament, ΔR
2
 = .02, F(1, 215) = 3.95, p < .05. We further examined 
this interaction following Aiken and West (1991). As depicted in Figure 3, switching cost was 
positively associated with the ease of initiating worry (i.e., the lower the ability to switch mental 
sets, the easier it was to initiate worry) among individuals with high negative temperament, β 
= .23, p = .03, but not among individuals with low negative temperament, β = -.08, p > .4. 
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 As seen in Table 10(a) and (b), the relationship between executive function (i.e., 
inhibition, switching) and worry termination was not modulated by negative temperament. The 
relationship between executive function (i.e., inhibition, switching) and rumination initiation was 
not modulated by negative temperament, either. In addition, none of the relationships between 
attention bias measures (i.e., attention bias to threat or attention bias to loss) and worry or 
rumination measures were modulated by negative temperament, suggesting that the moderation 
effect of negative temperament is specific to the relationship between executive function and 
worry/rumination. Finally, I explored whether the relationship between executive function and 
any of the bi-factor scores was moderated by negative temperament. None of the bi-factor scores 
were predicted by the interaction between executive function and negative temperament.  
DISCUSSION 
 This research highlights the potential value of distinguishing different phases of worry 
and rumination when investigating the attention mechanisms involved. We found that worry and 
rumination are linked with different types of attentional bias (e.g., threat/danger, loss/failure). In 
addition, we found some evidence that the initiation and termination phases are differentially 
associated with executive functions when taking negative temperament into account. Below, we 
discuss each finding in more detail.  
 We found that worry initiation was associated with bias to threat, whereas rumination 
termination was associated with bias to loss/failure. This finding is consistent with the existing 
conceptualization that describes worry as repeated ideation focused on to-be-avoided threats, and 
rumination as focused on to-be-understood loss or failure (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Smith & 
Alloy, 2009). This finding also strengthens the view that worry and rumination each have unique 
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aspects which may involve different types of attentional processes (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 
1989).  
 Although attention bias to threat has been associated with anxiety disorders, including 
GAD, only a couple of studies have examined a direct relationship between worry and attention 
bias to threat. To my knowledge, there are only two attention bias modification studies (Hayes et 
al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2010) which demonstrated the link between worry and attention bias to 
threat. However, these studies either pre-selected participants based on their worry scores (i.e., 
recruiting high worriers) or did not assess worry per se, rather assessing negative automatic 
thoughts. It still remains unclear if there is a direct correlational relationship between worry and 
attentional bias to threat in an unselected, non-clinical population. Using a laboratory measure of 
worry, we found that the ease of initiating worry was associated with a tendency to orient 
attention away from threat information. This finding contradicts what was expected given the 
previous findings showing that clinical anxiety patients and nonclinical populations with high 
levels of anxiety vulnerability orient attention toward threat-related information (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005).  
 A couple of features of this study may account for why worry initiation was associated 
with orienting attention away from threat information. First the mildly threatening stimuli used in 
our dot-probe paradigm might be one possible reason. A few studies found that, in a probe task 
using neutral and threatening stimuli, higher stimulus threat levels led to faster detection 
(vigilance), whereas low levels of stimulus threat led to slowed detection of probes in the same 
location (avoidance) (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Wilson & MacLeod, 
2003). We did not use the types of threat stimuli Koster et al. (2006) defined as highly 
threatening (e.g., mutilated face), but rather used threat stimuli that corresponded to what they 
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defined as mildly threatening (e.g., man with knife). Second, it is possible that the types of threat 
stimuli used in our dot-probe paradigm did not match the participants’ specific worry topics. 
Some evidence indicates that the attentional bias toward threat information is determined by the 
specific worries reported by participants – e.g., only those patients with predominant physical 
worries were disrupted by the presence of physical threat words (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). 
We used stimuli specifically related to physical threat or danger (but not social or other types of 
threat) in order to differentiate them from the loss/failure stimuli. Thus, it is possible that only 
using stimuli of physical threat and danger might have failed to capture the broader range of 
worry topics in which individuals typically engage and instead elicited bias away from threat 
stimuli.  
 It is also possible that the current result could be attributed to the unreliability of the dot-
probe task. Although a dot-probe task is one of the most frequently used attention bias measures, 
it has poor psychometric properties, being neither internally consistent nor stable over time 
(Schmukle, 2005). It should not be entirely surprising then that results with the dot probe 
paradigm have been largely inconsistent, particularly with a non-clinical population., Only some 
studies using threat-related stimuli found the expected attentional bias towards threat among 
individuals with high anxiety (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 
In contrast, other studies reported that individuals with high anxiety orient their attention away 
from threat-related stimuli (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999) or found no attention bias 
(Bradley et al., 1997; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 1999).  
 Recently, however, some researchers have proposed that the inconsistent results using the 
dot-probe task may not be due to the paradigm itself, but rather to the way we have 
conceptualized attention bias (Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014, 2015). Zvielli and colleagues 
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(2015) argue that attention bias is not a static entity as traditionally assumed, but rather is a 
dynamic process that fluctuates over time. Accordingly, they proposed a novel way of 
conceptualizing attention bias that focuses on the dynamic features of attention bias expression, 
including phasic bursts, variability and changes over time (Zvielli et al., 2014, 2015).   
 We found that difficulty terminating rumination, but not rumination initiation, was 
positively associated with attentional vigilance (orienting) toward loss/failure information. 
Previous research has shown that rumination is related with difficulty disengaging from 
dysphoric stimuli, and such attention bias was typically observed when the stimuli was exposed 
for one second or longer (Gotlib et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), suggesting that the bias 
may occur at a late stage of processing. In our study, even when the stimuli was presented 
relatively briefly (500 ms), the bias toward loss and failure information was clearly observed, 
especially in association with difficulty terminating rumination. In addition, the present research 
suggests that an attentional bias associated with rumination is not limited to mood-congruent 
stimuli, but encompasses stimuli with the broader theme of loss and failure. This finding 
suggests that a bias oriented to loss and failure information may be a maintaining factor that 
prohibits individuals from terminating rumination.  
 Although a number of studies looked into the relationship between specific executive 
function and worry or rumination (e.g., Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2013; De Lissnyder et al., 
2012), they did not assess different kinds of executive functions or examine both worry and 
rumination in the same study. Nor were the different phases of worry and rumination assessed.  
Current findings suggest that difficulty in terminating rumination is more associated with 
inhibition, but not switching ability, and negative temperament needs to be taken into 
consideration in assessing such relationship. This result is consistent with findings from an anti-
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saccade task (De Lissnyder et al., 2012) showing that ruminators, compared to non-ruminators, 
experience impaired performance on inhibition. Similarly, Whitmer and Banich (2007) showed 
that rumination is associated with a deficit in inhibition ability but not with switching ability.  
Different from previous findings, however, we observed such trend (lower inhibition, higher 
rumination) only among individuals with high levels of negative temperament. Furthermore, 
such relationship held only in association with difficulty terminating rumination but not with the 
ease of initiating rumination. Unexpectedly, individuals with low neuroticism showed the 
opposite relationship; the higher the inhibition, the greater the difficulty in terminating 
rumination. The current finding suggests that the maintenance of rumination may depend on both 
executive function (i.e., inhibition) and temperament. As previous research suggested that the 
likelihood of observing impaired cognitive control in negative contexts depends on a preexisting 
vulnerability conferred by high negative temperament (Hur et al., 2015), it is possible that in the 
presence of internal or external negative stimuli (e.g., stress, negative memory), elevated 
negative temperament activates the existing vulnerability in executive function to disrupt thought 
regulating processes, making it difficult to disengage from ruminative thoughts. It is also 
possible that individuals with high negative temperament have more frequent negative thoughts 
regarding past behaviors, and, when they have difficulty inhibiting those thoughts, the stream of 
negative thoughts may be more reinforced. It is important to note, however, that the way 
inhibition was operationalized in the task-switching paradigm was very specific and narrow (i.e., 
how easy it is to overcome a recently inhibited dimension) and may not capture different aspects 
of inhibition. Therefore, the present study’s findings regarding inhibition warrants further 
investigation using a different kind of inhibition task that captures broader aspects of inhibition.  
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 On the other hand, the ease of initiating worry was shown to be associated with both 
switching ability and negative temperament, such that for participants high in negative 
temperament (but not those low in negative temperament), switching cost was positively 
associated with the ease of initiating worry. Though the executive function most frequently 
related to worry is working memory (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2013; Hayes, Hirsch, & 
Mathews, 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011), these studies rarely examined other executive functions 
such as inhibition and switching function. Dosenbach et al. (2008) proposed a dual-network 
framework of top-down control in which two functional systems involved in goal-directed, 
executive processes are differentiated: a set-maintenance (maintenance) system and a rapid-
adaptive (flexibility) system. Since both working memory and switching function are highly 
relevant to the flexibility system (Niznikiewicz et al., in preparation; Dosenbach et al., 2008), it 
is possible that worry is specifically related to difficulty in continuous monitoring of and 
adjustment to the environment. The current finding further suggests that the initiation of worry 
may depend on both the shifting function and negative temperament. It is possible that 
individuals with high negative temperament may come up with negative thoughts about the 
future more easily, and when they have difficulty switching from this negative thought, the 
worry process is initiated. It is also possible that affective instability combined with difficulty in 
cognitively re-adjusting to the environment may manifest an initiation of worry as a maladaptive 
coping strategy. Though it was initially expected that the executive function and moderation 
effect of negative temperament would be particularly associated with the termination phase, no 
such relationship was observed in association with difficulty terminating worry.  
 Although we found some links between attention (i.e., attention bias, executive function) 
and the different phases of worry and rumination measured by laboratory tasks,  it is important to 
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note that we did not find any relationship between attention measures and the bi-factor scores 
derived from the worry and rumination questionnaires (PSWQ, RRQ). This may indicate that the 
individual differences in attention associated with worry and rumination are better captured when 
using behavioral tasks differentiating the initiation and termination phases of worry and 
rumination, as compared to when using self-report measures with no such distinction.  
 The current study highlights the possibility that attentional biases to different types of 
emotional information are involved in worry vs. rumination, and that the interactive effect of 
distinct executive function and negative temperament may predict different phases of worry and 
rumination. We acknowledge that a limitation of the current study is that multiple tests were 
performed, yet no adjustment for multiple testing (e.g., Bonferroni correction) was made. Thus, 
replication of the current findings with a larger and diverse sample (potentially including a 
clinical sample) is warranted. Future research needs to further examine the mechanisms and 
nature of the interaction between executive functions and negative temperament in predicting 
worry and rumination processes. It is also important to point out that the current lab measure of 
different phases of worry and rumination may not optimally capture the inter- and intra- 
variability of individual differences in worry and rumination patterns of interest. Continuous 
effort is needed to develop and improve measurements for assessing worry and rumination as a 
dynamic process that unfolds over time. In addition, traditional tasks used to measure attentional 
bias can be supplemented with additional measures of cognitive processing and performance, 
including implicit measures like eye tracking and psychophysiological measures such as EEG 
and neuroimaging. Given that the present findings are based on a cross-sectional design, future 
research is warranted to investigate the causal relationships of distinctive attentional processes 
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and different phases of worry and rumination, using rigorous longitudinal designs or 
experimental manipulations. 
  





 The present research has yielded a number of interesting findings that help shed light on 
the nature of the attentional and affective mechanisms associated with worry and rumination. In 
Chapter 2, we found that the structural relationship between worry and rumination is best 
represented by a bi-factor model. This suggests that worry and rumination share certain common 
aspects (negative repetitive thinking), but that there are still unique aspects to each. In Chapter 3, 
we examined the utility of two new alternative measures (i.e., laboratory tasks, ecological 
momentary assessment) in assessing the initiation and termination phases of worry and 
rumination based on Berenbaum’s (2010) IT model. In Chapter 4, we found that 1) worry and 
rumination are linked with different types of attentional bias (e.g., threat/danger, loss/failure), 
and 2) the initiation and termination phases are differentially associated with executive functions 
when taking negative temperament into account. These findings highlight several important 
directions for future research examining the attentional mechanisms associated with worry and 
rumination.  
 A great deal of research is needed to further our understanding of the nature of the 
common and specific features of worry and rumination. First, researchers need to examine the 
mechanisms of repetitiveness in worry and rumination that bring about a sense of 
uncontrollability. For example, it would be valuable to explore how the self-focused attention 
and negative interpretation biases that are commonly associated with worry and rumination may 
reinforce negative thoughts. It would also be important to examine how worry and rumination 
mutually influence each other in maintaining the negative stream of thoughts. Second, more 
research is need to examine the differential temporal orientations (i.e., future-oriented vs. past-
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orientated) involved in worry and rumination as a way to delineate the unique characteristics of 
each. In doing so, it would be worth paying attention to the different basic cognitive processes 
(e.g., memory, attention, planning, creativity, problem-solving) involved in future-oriented vs. 
past-oriented thinking. For example, an understanding of the degree to which individuals with 
excessive worry are able to engage in specific modes (or aspects) of future thinking (e.g., 
simulation, prediction, intention, planning) could shed light on the mechanisms specifically 
involved in worry. Similarly, if we could distinguish the cognitive and affective processes 
involved in reflection vs. rumination we may better understand rumination-specific features.  
 Future research is also warranted to further examine the mechanisms involved in the 
modulating effect of negative temperament in the relationship between specific executive 
functions and worry/rumination.  It would valuable to examine which specific characteristics of 
negative temperament confer vulnerability to negative repetitive thinking in individuals with 
executive deficits and how they operate. One such characteristic is the increased reactivity to 
stressors involved in negative temperament (Ingram et al., 1998). It is possible that such 
sensitivity creates a context for individuals with executive deficits to become more vulnerable to 
worry and rumination. In addition, research should explore the causal antecedents of executive 
function deficits and negative temperament (e.g., genes) to delineate their link to worry and 
rumination. For example, when combined with negative temperament and other factors (e.g., life 
stress), executive function deficits may serve as ‘endophenotypes’ (Gottesman & Gould, 2003) 
to confer risk for worry and rumination. More research is needed to examine the nature of their 
interaction.  
 Next, future research should continue to investigate better ways to measure worry and 
rumination processes. First, it will be important to continue to explore which specific methods 
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(e.g, laboratory, experience sampling method) and design features (e.g., whether to incorporate 
individuals’ specific worry/rumination topic, time intervals for thought sampling) best capture 
within- and between- individual differences in worry and rumination. In doing so, there may not 
be one optimal method. Rather, the best method to use may change depending on researchers’ 
interests and goals (e.g., assessing worry vs. rumination specific features or a temporal process of 
repetitive thinking). In addition, it will be worthwhile to consider conceptualizing the initiation 
and termination phases of worry and rumination as an interactive process in which negative 
repetitive thoughts influence each other, and developing measurements that can capture such 
dynamic processes. For example, termination of a negative thought may contribute to the 
initiation of another negative thought. Thus, it may be important to assess the intensity and 
variability of negative thoughts over an extended period of time. In doing so, the use of 
psychophysiological measures (e.g., EEG, fMRI) could help assess changes in neural activities 
so as to index the initiation, disengagement, and re-initiation of worrisome and ruminative 
thoughts over time.  
 I have several recommendations regarding future research examining the relation 
between worry and rumination and attentional bias and executive functions. First, increasing 
evidence indicates that attention bias is not a stable and static entity but rather a dynamic process 
that fluctuates over time (Zvielli et al., 2014, 2015). Thus, researchers should to pay attention to 
different features of attention bias, such as phasic bursts, variability, and changes over time by 
adopting measurement methods and approaches that can index such features (Zvielli et al., 2014, 
2015). Second, future researchers should assess not just individual differences in “capacity” of 
executive functions, but also how those  differences “fluctuate” (the degree to which each 
function drops from the individual’s baseline) at a given trigger (e.g., stress). Third, given that 
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performance-based measures of executive function only provide information regarding 
performance in a highly structured environment (i.e., processing efficiency), it is also important 
to consider supplementing performance-based measures of executive functions with other 
measurements, such as rating measures and experience sampling methods (Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, Van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2011) in order to capture different aspects of executive 
function (e.g., individual goal pursuit) and an individual’s functioning in real-life contexts.  
 Given that worry and rumination are important features of anxiety disorders and 
depression, future research should employ some of the strategies in the present research (e.g., 
using laboratory tasks to measure different phases of worry and rumination) to examine 
attentional and affective mechanisms in larger and more diverse samples, in particular samples 
which would be expected include more individuals with diagnosable disorders (e.g., treatment 
seeking samples). Such an approach would enable us to capture a broader range of worry and 
rumination patterns among individuals and to make claims about the psychopathology related to 
these thinking patterns. Given that the present findings are based on a cross-sectional design, 
future research is warranted to investigate the causal relationships of distinctive attentional 
processes and different phases of worry and rumination. Longitudinal designs or experimental 
designs could be employed to test the causal link between attentional and executive processes 
and worry and rumination and to rule out rival hypotheses. For example, researchers could test 
whether an attention bias modification program or executive function training program would 
result in changes in the initiation or termination phases of worry and rumination.  
  




Table 1. Goodness of Fit Statistics for Alternative Factor Models of the PSWQ/RRQ 
Model χ
2
 df CFI RMSEA 
Single-factor model  3379.52 350 .98 .12 
Two-factor model 1110.59 349 .99 .06 
Bi-factor model 592.13 322 1.00 .04 
Note. N = 564. χ
2
 = chi-square goodness of fit statistic; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = 
comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation 
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Table 2. Factor Loadings for the Best Fitting Bi-Factor Model for the PSWQ/RRQ Items 







PSWQ items    
1. If I don’t have enough time to do everything, I don’t worry 
about it. 
.32 .46  
2. My worries overwhelm me. .68 .49  
3. I don’t tend to worry about things. .55 .55  
4. Many situations make me worry. .67 .50  
5. I know I shouldn’t worry about things, but I just can’t help 
it. 
.69 .52  
6. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot. .66 .45  
7. I am always worrying about something. .63 .55  
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. .60 .43  
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about 
everything else I have to do. 
.49 .49  
10. I never worry about anything. .61 .54  
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I 
don’t worry about it anymore. 
.43 .36  
12. I’ve been a worrier all my life. .54 .49  
13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. .68 .50  
14. Once I start worrying, I can’t stop. .70 .47  
15. I worry all the time. .65 .54  
16. I worry about projects until they are done. .56 .44  
RRQ items    
1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish 
I'd stop thinking about. 
.74  .01 
2. I always seem to be "re-hashing" in my mind recent things 
I've said or done. 
.72  .32 
3. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about 
myself. 
.76  .13 
4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my 
thoughts keep going back to what happened. 
.72  .33 
5. I tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me 
for a really long time afterward. 
.84  .27 
6. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done 
with. 
.75  .14 
7. Often I'm playing back over in my mind how I acted in a 
past situation. 
.69  .66 
8. I often find myself re-evaluating something I've done. .66  .56 
9. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long. .72  .13 
10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. .80  -.17 
11. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer 
concern myself with. 
.67  .32 
12. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my 
embarrassing or disappointing moments. 
.67  .32 
Note. N = 564. Presented numbers are standardized coefficients (ranging from -1 to 1). All factors are 
uncorrelated. All factor loadings are significant at p < .01 except RRQ item #1’s loading on the Rumination-
specific factor.  
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Table 3. Structural Relations Between the PSWQ/RRQ Factors and Approach/Avoidance 
temperaments and Anxiety/Depression symptoms.  
Variables Results when each criterion variable 
was entered separately 
Results when each criterion variable 

















.88* .37* .05 .89* .36* .04 
Approach 
Temperament 
-.24* .27* -.15* -.32* .13* .03 
Anxious 
Arousal 
.30* .16* .05 .32* .15* .02 
Anhedonic 
Depression 
.56* -.01 -.05 .60* -.02 -.06 
 Note. N = 564. Presented numbers are standardized coefficients (ranging from -1 to 1). Asterisks 
(*) indicate coefficients that were significant at p < .01.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of LAB and EMA Measures  
 Worry Rumination 
Initiation Frequency of 
continuing 
worry 
Time Spent Difficulty 
Terminating 
Initiation Frequency of 
continuing 
rumination 
Time Spent Difficulty 
Terminating 
LAB         
Possible Score Range  0 to 9 1 to 3 1 to 5 1 to 5 0 to 9 1 to 3 1 to 5 1 to 5 
Mean  2.63 1.94 2.86 2.59 2.37 1.97 2.77 2.63 
Std Dev 2.77 .44 .76 .91 2.55 .42 .80 .91 
EMA         
Possible Score Range  0 to 1 0 to1 1 to 5 1 to 5 0 to 1 0 to1 1 to 5 1 to 5 
Mean  .36 .12 1.75 1.52 .24 .12 1.72 1.48 
Std Dev .22 .16 .49 .65 .22 .17 .48 .74 
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Worry     
        LAB    
                Initiation .21 .30
*
 .15 





        EMA    
                Initiation .40
**
 .01 .18 
                Termination  .30
*
 .20 .02 
Rumination    
        LAB    
                Initiation .20 -.09 .52
**
 
                Termination .21 .18 .35
**
 
        EMA    
                Initiation .07 .03 .07 
                Termination .26 .01 .28* 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tail 
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Table 6. Correlations Between LAB and EMA Measures  
 LAB EMA 
 Worry Rumination Worry Rumination 
 Initiation Termination Initiation Termination Initiation Termination Initiation Termination 
LAB         
   Worry         
                Initiation  −−−        
             Termination  .59
**
 −−−       
   Rumination         
                Initiation .39
**
 .24 −−−      




 −−−     
EMA         
   Worry         
                Initiation .10 .33
*
 .15 .07 −−−    










 −−−   
   Rumination         
                Initiation .11 .27
*
 .19 .07 .76
**
 .18 −−−  




 .09 −−− 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tail.
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Table 7(a). Descriptive Statistics of Laboratory Measures  
 Worry Rumination 
Initiation Frequency of 
continuing 
worry 
Time Spent Difficulty 
Terminating 
Initiation Frequency of 
continuing 
rumination 
Time Spent Difficulty 
Terminating 
Possible Score Range  0 to 9 1 to 3 1 to 5 1 to 5 0 to 9 1 to 3 1 to 5 1 to 5 
Mean  2.7 2.1 3.0 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.7 
Std Dev 2.4 0.5 0.9 1.0 2.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 
 
Table 7(b). Descriptive Statistics of Attention Measures (RTs in millisecond) 






Mean  -1.4 1.9 63.0 85.9 
Std Dev 23.5 22.6 70.3 71.6 
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Table 8. Correlations between Lab Measures of Worry and Rumination and the Bi-factor Scores 




Worry initiation .18** .04 .02 
Rumination initiation .19** -.14* .13* 
Worry Termination .25** .12* -.05 
Rumination Termination .22** .09 -.01 
Note: * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, one-tail 
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Lab Measures     
Worry Initiation -.14* .05 -.01 .07 
Worry Termination -.12 .01 .04 -.10 
Rumination Initiation -.04 .05 .03 .02 
Rumination Termination -.10 .16* .05 -.01 
Bi-Factor Scores     
Common Factor -.04 .02 -.06 .05 
Worry-specific -.01 .01 .05 -.08 
Rumination-specific .01 .02 -.04 .05 
Note: * p < 0.05, two-tail 
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Table 10(a). Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Different 











  β ΔR
2
  β ΔR
2
  β ΔR
2
 
Step 1   .01    .02   .05**    .03* 
   Inhibition   .00    .04    .04    .05  
   NT  .10    .12    .22**    .18**  
Step 2   .00    .00   .00    .03** 
   Inhibition x NT  .00    .00   -.02   -.19**  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Table 10(b). Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Different 











  β ΔR
2
  β ΔR
2
  β ΔR
2
 
Step 1   .02    .01      .06*
* 
  .03* 
  Switching Cost   .07    .02   -.09   .00  
  NT  .10    .12        .22**      .18**  
Step 2   .02*    .00   .00   .00 
  Switching Cost x NT  .13*    .06    .01   .01  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
  














Figure 2. The moderation effect of Inhibition Ability and Negative Temperament in predicting 
Rumination Termination  
  




Figure 3. The moderation effect of Switching Cost and Negative Temperament in predicting 
Worry Initiation  
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